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The problem that will be discussed in this study is that
the process of transferring technology from developed countries
to less developed countries is so inefficient that it tends to
widen the existing tachnological gap between them.
An attempt is made by the writer to examine the process
of transferring technology from developed countries to less
developed countries, in order to see whether such transfer will
narrow the technological gap between them or not.
The result obtained from this study is that technology
transfer is a very important condition for the industrial
development in less developed countries. However, technology
transfer from developed countries to less developed comtries
has been accompanied by many restrictions and limitations.
Such action will never result in an increase of technological
capabilities of less developed countries and will keep the tech¬
nological gap continually wide between them and the developed
countries.
The main sources of information were the United Nations
Documents on Transfer of Technology. Many books, journals and
periodicals were also used as references.
ACKNOITLEDGEMENTS
I would like to give special thanks to Dr. Thomas
Boston, my advisor and major professor, who directed the
study. His guidance and assistance throughout the course
of the study made this finished work possible.
Also, I would like to thank my wife, Amal for her
encouragement and support.
Further, thanks are due Dr. Michael Henry and Pros-
sor Warsi for serving as first and second readers respectively
in the thesis committee; Mrs. Ruth Eley for typing the final
draft of the thesis.




LIST OF TABLES iii
LIST OF FIGURES v
Chapter
INTRODUCTION 1
Purpose of This Thesis 2I.THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT .. 4
R6cD and Trade 4
Primary Commodities and LDCs 13II.THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO LDCs AND THE
UNFAVORABLE TERMS THAT ARE ASSOCIATED WITH IT .... 22
The World Patent System and Its Distribution ... 22
The Contractual Agreements and the Transfer
of Technology Between LDCs and DCs and the
Restrictions that Are Associated with It 26
The Restriction of Competition 27
Factors Influencing the Selection of Particular
Technology in LDCs 31
The Price of Technology Transfer to LDCs 34III.THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE
REVERSE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 39
The Magnitude of Skill Flows from DCs to LDCs... 40
The Cause of Migration 46
Some Policy Issues for Action 46IV.THE NEO-TECHNOLOGY HYPOTHESIS OF THE PATTERN
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER FROM DCs TO LDCs 49
The Theory of the Product Cycle 50
LDCs Efforts to Narrow the Technological Gap ... 54






1. Technological Dependence: Selected Socio-
Economic Indicators, 1976 5
2. Regression Equations Uisng RD. as Principal
Explanatory Variable of U.S. Export Performance
(X^^), 1975 8
3. Regression Equations Using RD. as Principal
Explanatory Variable of U.S. Export
Performance X2, 1975 9
4. Composition of World Exports and Imports,
By Group of Countries, 1976 11
5. Research Intensity and World Trade Performance by
United States' Industries, 1962 14
6. Prices of Fifteen Primary Commodity Exports of
Developing Market Economy, 1973-1977 16
7. Manufactured Goods Exports (Unit Value Indexes in
National Currencies, for Selected Developed
Countries), 1960-1977 18
8. Net Trade Balance of Industrial Countries, 1973-1976 .. 20
9. Net Trade Balance of LDCs Other than OPEC
Countries, 1973-1976 21
10. Patent Holdings in Developing Countries by
Ownership and Use, 1972 24
11. Distribution of Patent Grant by Sectors in 1971 25
12. Contracts Containing Restrictive Export Clauses,
According to the Nature of the Restriction, 1975 26
13. Contractual Agreements Containing Restrictive
Clauses, Classified by Industry, 1975 28
14. Average Hourly Earning of Workers Processing or
Assembling U.S. Materials Overseas and in the
United States, 1970 33
iii
iv
15. Direct Costs of Transfer Technology in Comparison
with Other Relevant Foreign Exchange Flows of
Developing Countries, 1968 35
16. Payments by Developing Countries for the Transfer
of Technology and their Relationship to GDP
and Exports, 1965-1971 36
17. Relationship Between Increase in Pa3mient for
Transfer of Technology, Manufacturing Output
and GDP for Selected Countries, 1965-1970 38
18. Trends in Skilled Migration from Developing
Countries to the United States of America, Canada
adn the United Kingdom, 1961-1976 41
19. Share of Developing Countries in Total Skilled
Migration into the United States of America, Canada
and the United Kingdom, Total 1961-1976 42
20. Measures of Imputed Capital Value of Skill Flows
from Developing Countries to the United States of
America, Canada and the United Kingdom, 1961-1972 .. 44
21. Contribution to the United States Net Income Gain
by Developing Countries from Skilled Immigration
into the United States of America in 1970 45
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Trade Balance of Five Technologically Intensive
Industries and All Other Manufacturing Industries'
Trade Balance, 1963-69 11
2. World Bank Index of the Terms of Trade of Primary
Commodities, 1954-1975 15
3. Growth Rates of Total Value of Exports 19
4. Income Terms of Trade (purchasing power of exports) .... 19
5. How Trade Balances Might Evolve Over "Product
Cycle" of a New Good 52
V
INTRODUCTION
The transfer of technology from developed to less
developed countries is one way of accelerating the rate of
economic growth of the latter while also bringing about
rapid improvement of their social and economic structure. In
recent years, there has been increasing concern by less deve¬
loped countries (LDCs) that the process of the transfer of
technology is very inefficient and has been left to the pre¬
vailing market forces. This tends to accentuate rather than
alleviate some aspects of underdevelopment.
The less developed countries argue that they do not
share fairly modem technology with developed countries (DCs) .
Thus, the technological level in LDCs has been deteriorating
while it continues to in^jrove in developed covmtries. At the
same time, DCs have acquired a monopoly over research and
development (R&D) .
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are the primary
vehicle for transferring technology to poor countries. Such
firms, some 500 to 700 in total, mainly American, now accomt
for the bulk of the direct investment, production, trade,
finance and technology of the non-socialist world.
About 250 to 300 MNCs accomt for over 70 percent of
total U.S. foreign investment, about 165 for 80 percent of
that of the United Kingdom, and 82 for over 70 percent
1
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of West Germany.^ LDCs argue that MNCs have already set in
motion a process of industrialization highly similar to that
found in the advanced nations of the West. This industriali¬
zation is not only similar in terms of the output of industry
(caputal goods and private consunqjtion goods), but also in terms
of the mechanical technology and human technical skills needed
for its implementations. LDCs consider this process of trans¬
ferring technology as so inefficient that it tends to widen the
existing technological gap between them and DCs. This argument
is based on real experiences of LDCs. The technology trans¬
ferred to LDCs has been accompanied by many restrictions and
high prices. LDCs took those issues to the United Nations seek¬
ing solutions. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop¬
ment (UNCTAD) is moving in a positive direction toward resolving
some of the obstacles surrounding that problem.
Purpose of This Thesis
This thesis proposes to examine the validity of LDCs
accusation against DCs. This accusation states that, the less
developed countries have not been given much access to the
modem technology of DCs mainly because of the restrictive
business practices that are associated with the transfer of
^Sanjaya Lall, "Multinationals and Development: A New
Look," Westminister Bank Quarterly Review (February 1975), p. 57.
2
Charles K. Wilber, Ed., The Political Economy of
Development yid Underdevelopments: MNCs and the Underdevelop¬
ment of Third World, R. Muler (New York: Random House. 1978).
pT 153.
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technology to LDCs. As a result, LDCs have not been able to
establish the technological capability that will enable them
to solve many of their development problems.
Assuming that these accusations by LDCs are valid,
then we may ask whether such restrictive practices are coinci¬
dental or the intended policies of DCs. If these policies are
not coincidental, then what is the gain to DCs and what are
their motives for undertaking such restrictive practices? Are
there other practices by DCs that contribute to the widening
of the technological gap between DCs and LDCs? These are the
questions that will be addressed in this study.
The study is divided into four chapters. The first
chapter attempts to explain the technological gap that exists
between DCs and LDCs in terms of the technological endowment
available to the two sides. It also emphasizes the role of
technology in trade and development. The second chapter exa¬
mines closely the restrictive practices of DCs in the area of
transferring technology to LDCs and the unfavorable terms that
are associated with such transfer. The third chapter is con¬
cerned with the phenomenon of "reverse transfer of technology"
or "brain drain" and its impact on the industrial development
in LDCs. The fourth chapter attempts to confirm the LDCs
allegation against DCs in the area of technology transfer
through the Neo-technology Hypothesis of the Pattern of Inter¬
national trade, and the model of the product-cycle.
CHAPTER 1
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
R6eD and Trade
It is a fact that technology can help promote economic
and social growth in the LDCs. It is also a fact that tech¬
nology has been the instrument for economic growth in the
DCs. The economic growth of industrialized countries has
depended to a great extent on technological innovation backed
by R&D and capital investment. In LDCs, R&D has played a much
smaller role. This is mainly due to lack of money, knowledge,
and almost non-availability of scientific research facilities.
Also, the opportunities for industrial or agricultural improve¬
ment is not enough to ensure economic progress.
Table 1 shows that in 1976 the expenditure on R&D in
some of the DCs was 1.2 percent of GNP. LDCs, on the other
hand, had a much lower expenditure on R&D. Asia had 0.3 per¬
cent and Latin America 0.2 percent of their expenditure on R&D.
The number of technicians engaged in R&D per 10,000 population
was much lower in LDCs. It was 8.2 in some DCs while Africa
had 0.4 percent, Asia 0.6 percent and Latin America 1.4 per¬
cent .
The R&D expenditure is also reflected in the trade




TECHNOLOGICAL DEPENDENCE: SELECTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC
INDICATORS (Averages expressed as medians for





countries- Africa- Asia- Latin America-
I. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(i) Ratio of total stock of
scientists and engineers
per 10,000 pop. 112 5.8 22.0 69
(ii) Ratio of technicians
per 10,000 142.3 8.3 23.4 72.2
(iii) Scientists and engineers
engaged in R & D per
10,000 pop. 10.4 0.35 1.6 1.15
(iv) Technicians engaged in
R & D per 10,000 pop. 8.2 0.4 0.6 1.4
(v) Expenditures on R & D





nicians as percentage of
economically active pop. 11.1 2.7 5.7
(vii) Percentage of the economi
cally active population
employed in manufacturing







(ix) Ratio of primary and
secondary enrollment to
school age population 92®/ 32 56 78
6
Sources: (1) - (Iv): UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, 1973,
table 8.3; and United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1974, table 199.
(iv) and (w): ILO. Yearbook of Statistics. 1974, tables 2A
and 2B.
(vili) and (lx): Handbook of International Trade and Develop¬
ment Statistics, supplement for 1973, table 6.8.
The size of the sample in this column varies in indicator, ranging
from four countries in line (li) to 25 countries in line (ix).
W The size of the sample in this columb varies by indicator, ranging
from eight countries in lines (i) and (ii) to 46 countries in lines
(viii) and (ix).
c/ Excludes China. The size of the sample in this column varies by indi¬
cator, ranging from seven countries in line (vi) to 36 countries in lines
(viii) and (ix).
The size of the sample in this column varies by indicator, ranging
from seven countries in lines (i) and (ii) to 43 in line (viii).
Includes Greece and Turkey.
Taking upper limit of estimates where no precise figures were given,
e.g., for 10-15 percent, 15 percent would be used for high estimates and
10 percent for low estimate.
Note: The classification used in this table is intended for statistical
convenience and does not necessarily imply any judgment regarding the
stage of development of any particular country.
R6cD, the better the trade balance on manufactured goods will be.
For example, in the period of 1963-1969, the U.S.A. had a sig¬
nificant and positive relationship between its exports per¬
formance and the intensity of R&D in its industries. This
positive relationship has been noticed by Mr. Thomas C. Lowin-
3
ger within his empirical work. He sets a framework for
multiple regression analysis to test the effect of the tech¬
nology factor (R&D) on the commodity composition of U.S. trade
O
Thomas C. Lowinger, "The Technology Factor and Export
Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Industries," Economic Inquiry
13 (2) (June 1975):221-236.
His general regression equation is
4
in five major industries,
X = B + RD + W + TF + ES.
a
This regression employs two measures of U.S. export
performance.
a) - U.S. industries export shares in "world"
market during a recent time period (1963-1969); see table 2.
b) X2 - changes in U.S. industries relative export
shares over time (1963-1969); see table 3.
RDa - Scientists and engineers engaged in research and
development as a percentage of industry's total
employment 1967-1969.
ES - Economics of scale variable; it relates pro¬
ductivity changes to increases in the size of
establishment.
W - Ratio of wages and salaries of all employees
industry's value added, 1967-69.
TF - Export weighted average of foreign tariff rate
on the industry's products.
Tables 1 and 2 show the results of the multiple regressions. It
turns out that there is a positive relationship between the U.S.
export performance (X^,X2) and RDa. On the whole, the techno¬
logical intensity variable (RDa) turns out to be the single
most potent explanatory variable of U.S. industries revealed
comparative advantage.
4
The industries covered in his study were aircraft,
chemicals, electrical equipment, communication instrument,
and machinery.
TABLE 2
REGRESSION EQUATIONS USING RD^ AS PRINCIPAL EXPLANATORY
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Definition of variables for Tables 1, 2, and 3.
= U.S. industries export shares of "world" trade, 1968-70
X2 = Changes in the relative export share of U.S. industries, 1960-62 to 1968-70.
RD^= Scientists and Engineers engaged in R&D as a percentage of total employment, 1967-69.W = Ratio of wages and salaries of all employees in industry value added, 1967-69.
Eg = Economies of scale variable taken from Huffauer (1970, pp. 212-20).
Tp = Export weighted averages of foreign tariff rate on the industry products.
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are "t" coefficients. + — indicates 90 percent level of sig-* — indicates 95 percent level of signifi- nificance. ** — indicates 99 percent
cance. level of significance.
table 3
REGRESSION EQUATIONS USING RD^ AS PRINCIPAL EXPLANATORY
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^For definitions of variables see TABLE 1. Sources for table 2,1; Trade; OECD, Trade by Commodities.
Series B (various years). Tariffs; The weighted average foreign tariff rates were obtained from Treasury
Department study. The foreign countries included were the Group-of-Ten. The average foreign protection
was computed from post-Kennedy round tariffs. Cline and Hays (1973, Data Appendix). Research and Develop¬
ment; R&D is defined as "Basic and applied research in the Sciences and Engineering, and the design and
development of prototypes and processes." National Science Foundation, Research and Development in Industry,
1970, Washington, D.C., 1972. Other Characteristics; U.S. Department of Commerce, Annual Survey of Manufac¬
turers, 1970, Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures 1967, Vol. 1. Washington,
D.C., 1971.
Source; Thomas C. Lowlnger, "The Technology Factor and the Export Performance of U.S. Manufacturing




The coefficient of determination (R ) ranges from
. 731-. 891 in table 2, and .5-822 in table 3.
The combined trade surplus of U.S. five technology in¬
tensive industries rose from $7.7 billion to $11.1 billion
during the period 1963-69.^ At the same period of time, the
trade deficit of all other manufacturing industries grew from
$1.0 billion to $7.5 billion (see figure 1).
Let us now see the LDCs R&D capability in terms of
numbers of scientists and engineers compared to DCs. In 1976,
the nxmiber of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D was 10.4
per 10,000 population in DCs while in LDCs the nxmiber was only
3.7 per 10,000 population (see table 1). As a result the com¬
position of LDCs world trade looked like this; the LDCs are the
main supplier of raw and semi-raw materials to DCs, and they
imported almost all of their manufactured goods. Table 4
analyzes the exports and imports of DCs and LDCs for 1976,
dividing them by categories of goods. In 1976 LDCs exports con¬
sisted of 81.2 percent of raw or semi-raw materials. Their
export of manufactured goods amounted to 18.5 percent. The
import of manufactured good was estimated to 65.9 percent.
The thesis of Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon, (G-M-V) is
that, "All roads lead to a link between export performance and
R&D." The supportive evidence of this thesis derives from an
^Ibid., p. 221.
W. Gruber, D. Mehta, and R. Vernon, The R&D Factor in
International Trade and International Investment of United States
Industries," Journal of Political Economy (February 1967).
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Figure 1
I'luiiro 1. Trade balance of FivrTochnolcj;ic ally Intensix e ludiisl i ics*
and All Ollier Manufacturing Industries’ Trade Balance. 1
‘liK liules: Ain rail (SIC 3721; CMtcinicals (SIC 2S' 1 li c liical <'<tui|'mcnl amt i oiimiiiiiK.riKiii
(SIC 3()); Instrument.'! (SIC 3S) antt Mat him ry 'Sl(! 3S).
Source: ll.S., Drpartnii'iit of (auiiim'rcc, U S. (.in immlily Exports iiiid Impnit-. os Hnol' ' to
Output. Wa.shington, D.C. (various years).
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TABLE 4
COMPOSITION OF WORLD EXPORTS AND IMPORTS, BY











Primary Products 22.9 81.2 37.0 39.2
Food, beverages and toabcco
Crude materials (excluding
10.8 13.5 9.4 11.3
fuels), oils and fats
Mineral fuels and related
7.1 8.7 8.8 7.7
materials 5.0 59.0 18.8 20.2
Manufactured Products 75.7 18.5 56.5 59.2
Chemicals
Machinery and transport
9.4 1.4 4.8 6.9
equipment 37.7 3.7 29.3 28.2
Other manufactured goods 28.6 13.4 22.4 24.1
Miscellaneous 1.4 0.3 6.5 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IMPORTS
Primary Products 42.3 31.0 30.6 39.2
Food, beverages, and tobacco
Crude materials (excluding
11.3 10.4 13.5 11.3
fuels); oils and fats
Mineral fuels and related
8.5 4.7 7.8 7.7
materials 22.5 15.9 9.3 20.2
Manufactured Products 56.3 65.9 66.3 59.2
Chemicals
Machinery and transport
6.8 7.4 6.5 6.9
equipment 24.5 37.0 34.1 28.2
Other manufactured goods 25.0 21.5 25.7 24.1
Miscellaneous 1.4 3.1 3.1 1.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
World import figures include certain imports, which, because their
regions of destination could not be determined, are not otherwise in¬
cluded in the import figures in this table.
NOTE: Data do not include trade among the centrally planned economies
of Asis, the export of Rhodesia, or the trade between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.
Source: Based on data from United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statis¬
tics, vol. 32, no. 6 (June 1978), Special Table F.
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examination of the 1962 trade performance of nineteen United
States industries. In summarizing their results, the authors
observe, "In sum, one derives an evidence of high research
effort being correlated with industries that experience a great
trade surplus.... It is in these industries that the U.S.
trade advantage lies.^
Keesing's thesis is similar to that of G-M-V, "This
article tests the hypothesis that R&D activity is associated
with American competitive ability in manufacturing industries
Q
...." There turns out to be a powerful relation between the
intensity of R&D activity in U.S. industries and their export
performance. This finding is consistent with a view that the
world economic role of the U.S. involved the systematic export
9of new products.
Primary Commodities and LDCs
There is tremendous price fluctuation for primary com¬
modities as opposed to that of manufacturing commodities which
leads to the unfavorable terms of trade for LDCs. One reason
for the declining price of primary commodities is that DCs and
LDCs have competitive interests in the grain production. The
increasing technology in grain production (rice, wheat and oil
seed) by the U.S., Canada and Australia could be cited as a
^Ibid,, p. 30.
Q
D. B. Keesing, "The Impact of Research and Development
on United States Trade," Journal of Political Economy (February
1967) .
^Ibid. , p. 39.
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TABLE 5
RESEARCH INTENSITY AND WORLD TRADE PERFORMANCE BY
UNITED STATES' INDUSTRIES, 1962
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient for Indicated Cell)
Export Performance Measure % R2















U.S. World Exports in 1962 as a Percentage of World Exports of:
OECD countries 0.68 0.64
U.K. 0.28* 0.37
West Germany 0.08* 0.24*
France 0.60 0.59
Source: G-M-V, ££. cit., Table 3, Table 5.
E^: Exports as a percentage of sales, 1962.
E2‘ Excess of exports over imports as a percentage of sales, 1962.
R^: Total R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales, 1962.
R2: Scientists and engineers in R&D as a percentage of total
industry employment, 1962.




Table 6 shows the prices of fifteen major primary com¬
modity exports of developing market economies for the period
1973-1977 (annual and quarterly). It also demonstrates the
fluctuation in these prices. For example, the prices of sugar
in 1973 was 13 cents/lb., by 1974 it had increased to 34 cents/
lb., by 1973 it had declined to 20 cents/lb., in 1976 it had
declined to 12 cents/lb., then by 1977 it had declined also to
8 cents/lb. That is just one example.
Figure 2 shows the terms of trade for primary commo¬
dities of LDCs for 1954-1975 and the fluctuation that is asso¬
ciated with it. The price fluctuation has a direct effect on
FIGURE 2
VJorld Bank Index of the Terms of Trade
of Primary Commodities, 1954-1975
Source: Jere R. Behrnan, Development, the International Econo¬
mic Order, and Conmodity Agreements (Reading: Addison-
Wesley Company) , 1978, p"! 48.
TABLE 6
PRICES OF FIFTEEN MAJOR PRIMARY COMMODITY EXPORTS OF DEVELOPING MARKET ECONOMIES , 1973-1977 (annual and quarterly)





(1) (11) (ill) (Iv)
Petroleum^ ($/barrel) 2.7 9.8 10.7 11.5 12.4 11.5 11.5 12.1 12.1 12.7 12.7
Sugaf^ (cents/lb.) 13 34 20 12 8 11 8 9 7 9 7
Coffee^ (cents/lb.) 63 68 71 140 243 159 189 254 297 217 203
Copper^ (cents/lb.) 81 93 56 64 59 70 58 66 62 55 55
Timber^ (logs) ($/m3) 81 83 74 99 112 104 111 115 114 no 107
Cotton^ (cents/lb.) 59 63 54 76 70 83 83 80 78 63 59
Natural Rubber® (cents/lb.) 33 36 28 38 39 38 40 39 38 39 41
Iron Ore^ ($ met. ton) 17 20 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 22
Cocoa^® (cents/lb.) 65 98 75 110 220 117 149 192 120 248 229
Phosphate Rock^^ ($/met. ton) 14 55 67 36 31 35 35 34 31 29 29
Tln^^ (cents/lb.) 220 375 318 354 503 381 381 644 454 512 582
Maize^^ ($ met. ton) 99 132 120 112 95 118 103 110 100 80 91
Rice^^ ($ met. ton) 350 542 363 254 272 250 262 259 258 274 298
Beef15 (cents/lb.) n/a n/a 28 33 35 n/a 33 37 35 32 35
Teal® (centa/lb.) 48 64 63 70 122 76 77 120 163 108 97








^^Average of Malaysia, United Kingdom, and U.S.
^%nited States
^Average of Angola, Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala for
1973-1976; average of Colombia and Guatemalla for 1977.
^London Metal Exchange.
Average of Ivory Coast and Phillplnes
'Average of United States and Mexico
^Average of United States and Singapore.
Source: Annual figures for 1973 and 1974 based on data from World Bank, Economic Analysis and Projections Department, "Commodity Price






'Average of Argentina and Australia
'Average price at London auctions
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the revenues of Third World countries. On the other hand, the
price of manufactured export goods by DCs is not subject to
such price fluctuation. In fact, the movement in price has
been positive. Table 7 shows that movement.
The fluctuation in the prices of primary commodities
and the increasing prices of manufactured goods, together gives
some indications of the growth rate of the total value of
export in LDCs and the purchasing power of their export revenue
(see figures 3 and 4).
Figure 3 shows that the growth rate of total value
of export in DCs is relatively higher than in LDCs for the
period 1953-1973, except for the period 1957-1958, Figure 4
shows that the purchasing power of exports of DCs is relatively
higher than in LDCs for the period 1938-1972. Therefore, Third
World countries have to sell a greater volume of primary pro¬
ducts in exchange for manufactured goods.
Tables 8 and 9 show the net trade balance of LDCs
and the industrial countries. By comparing the net trade
balance of the two groups we see that LDCs face a chronic
balance of trade deficit as compared to the industrial countries.
For example, the net imports as a percentage of imports in the
industrial countries for the period 1973-76 ranged from 1.4-
7.5 percent, while in LDCs it ranged from 15.1-32 percent
during the same period.
It seems obvious that the rapid adoption of R&D in
LDCs is important in order to alleviate their financial prob¬
lems which is the major cause of the slow growth and
TABLE 7
MANUFACTURED GOODS EXPORTS
Indices 1970=100 Value in Billion U.S.$
1960 1965 1973 1974 1975 1976
I
1976
11 III IV I
1977
TI ~TTT
Unit value index5-• indice de valeur unitaire^
Total . 84 89 133 162 182 183 178 179 185 191 196 198 201
America 82 84 113 137 156 166 163 166 167 170 171 172 176
Canada 87 83 112 134 142 156 155 158 157 153 161 159 . . .
United States 81 84 113 137 159 170 166 168 170 175 175 176 isi
Europe 84 91 139 168 193 191 186 186 192 200 204 207 211
E.E.C.1 85 91 139 165 190 187 183 183 289 195 201 204 209
Belgium— Luxumbourg^ 87 89 137 171 185 184 177 180 183 194 • • • • • • 195
Denmark 89 94 146 176 205 208 199 205 210 220 225 224 • • .
France 87 93 143 162 197 > • * . • • • • . • . . • . • • • . • a *
Germany, Federal Rep. of 82 89 147 172 195 195 187 190 196 206 208 210 215
Italy^ 93 92 126 154 180 169 161 161 176 179 191 . . .
Netherlands 87 98 139 178 195 194 186 189 194 208 208 2i2 a ■ •
United_Kingdom 82 92 127 153 177 176 178 172 178 176 192 196 203
F. F T A 3 81 89 144 180 214 216 208 210 218 227 230 229 230
Austria 102 104 137 172 199 193 189 180 194 208 207 211 a a a
Finland 83 93 139 204 244 236 229 231 237 249 ■ • • ... a a a
Norway 80 91 132 177 219 210 200 201 219 220 224 • » • a a a
Sweden 78 84 143 173 210 219 209 214 218 234 240 ... a a .
Switzerland^ 76 87 154 185 220 224 218 224 225 230 229 230 230
Other Dev'd Man. Econ.^ 93 88 139 179 178 177 167 173 179 188 194 198 200
Japan 97 88 141 181 178 178 167 173 180 190 197 201 203
Footnotes: iincluding Ireland.
^Deri ed from sub-indexes using current weights.•^Including Iceland and Portugal.
Source: U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics
"Deceinber 1977), p. xxiv.
^Comprises Australia, Israel, Japan, New
and South Africa




Figure 3 Growth Rates of Total Value of Exports
(Source; World Bank, Trends in Developing Countries, 1973, Tabic 5.))
48 50 51 52 53 54 55 IM' 57 68 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 58 69 70 7; 72
fljure 4 Income Terms of Trade (purchasing power of exports)
(pjerce: U.N. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, August 1973, p. Ill; U.N. Year-
b*-.'; of International Trade Statistics, 1958, 1969.)
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TABLE 8
NET TRADE BALANCE OF INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES,
1973-76 (U.S. $ billions)
1973 1974 1975 1976
Export 376.390 503.610 537.310 596.950
Import 386.150 544.630 545.480 632.630
Net Import
Net Import as
9.760 41.020 8.170 35.680
% of Import 2.57o 7.5% 1.4% 5.6%
Computed
1977.
from: IMF, International Finance Statistics ,
TABLE 9
NET TRADE BALANCE OF LDCs OTHER THAN OPEC
COUNTRIES (U.S. $ billions)
1973 1974 1975 1976
Export 67.380 98.100 93.700 113.830
Import 79.370 130.670 137.890 142.970
Net Import 11.990 32.570 44.190 29.140
Net Import as
7o of Import 15.1% 24.9% 32% 20.3%
Computed from-. IMF, International Financial Statistics,
1977.
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development in LDCs. This is the dream of LDCs, but the role
of DCs in the field of technology transfer is not encouraging.
This will be the topic of discussion in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 2
THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO LDCs AND THE
UNFAVORABLE TERMS THAT ARE
ASSOCIATED WITH IT
This chapter examines the role of DCs in transferring
technology to LDCs. It also attempts to show the ineffi¬
ciency that is associated with the transfer of technology to
LDCs. In doing so, four important topics are discussed.
1) The world patents system and its distribution.
2) The contractural agreements on the transfer of
technology between LDCs and DCs, and the rest¬
rictions that are associated with it.
3) Factors influencing the selection of parti¬
cular technology in LDCs.
4) The price of technology transfer to LDCs.
The World Patent System and Its Distribution
Technology can be transferred from DCs to LDCs by means
of patents, licenses, technical and managerial know-how and
trademarks. In 1975 the U.N.. Department of Economics and
Social Affairs published their findings on the main charac¬
teristics of national and international patents. Also included
in the report were the abuses of patent monopolies and the
impact of the patent system on LDCs.
One of the characteristics that the survey points out is
22
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that the participation of LDCs in shaping as well as in the
operation of international patent system remained minimal.
For example, only 6 percent (roughly 200,000) of the 3.5 mil¬
lion in existence are owned by LDCs.^® Of the patents granted
by developing countries, about 84 percent or some 170,000 are
owned by foreigners. Most of them are held by large corpora¬
tions of five developed market economy countries such as the
U.S.A., the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, and France.
The patents held by foreigners in the LDCs are ex¬
tremely underutilized. Only about 5-10 percent of the 170,000
patents have been used in the production processes in LDCs up
to 1972, according to the U.N. report (see table 10). From a
sanple of 4,872 patents granted between 1960 and 1970 in major
industrial sectors in Peru, only fifty-four were reported to
have been exploited. In Argentina, patent utilization by the
affiliates of foreign did not exceed 5 percent throughout the
period 1957-1970. An examination of 3,513 patent processes or
products for Colombia showed that 2,534 of them belonged to
the textile and chemical industries. Only 10 percent of the
total were actually used in the production process in the
country up to 1970,^^
^^U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The
Role of Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Deveinp¬
ing Countries (New York: U.N. Publications. 1975)° p.4i7
^^U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The
Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries (Itew York: U.N. Publications. 1975), p. 40.
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TABLE 10
PATENT HOLDINGS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES BY








Developed countries 3,300 94




Held by nationals 30 16
Held by foreigners, of which: 170 84
used 10-20 5-10
not used 150-160 90-95
Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Countries (New York: U.N. Publications, 1975), p. ?1.
Table 11 shows the unequal participation of LDCs in the
patents of such modem sector as electrical equipment. The
share of LDCs in this particular sector was 5.7 percetn, com¬
pared with 12.4 percent for DCs. The former have been granted
a relatively large proportion (about 34.4 percent) of patents
in agricultural production as compared to 19.7 percent for
DCs.
Tables 10 and 11 demonstrate to a great extent the exces¬
sive monopoly of DCs over LDCs in regards to patents. The high
portion of patents granted by DCs to nationals of DCs reflects the
uneqxaal economic and technological strengths of DCs and LDCs. At the
25
TABLE 11
DISTRIBUTION OF PATENT GRANTS BY SECTORS













building; and mining ....
Engines and pumps; engineering
in general; lighting and






















2.4 3. 7 3.0
“ •• • •• 0.5
Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to
Developing Coimtries (New York: U.N. Publications, 1975), p. 41.
same time, LDCs remain, to a considerable extent, technologi¬
cally dependent on DCs.
1 5
Edith Penrose, "International Patenting and the Less
Developed Comtries," The Economic Journal, vol. 83. no. 331
(September 1973):768.
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The Contractual Agreements Between DCs and LDCs for
the Transfer o:^ Technology and the Restrictions
that are Associated with It
Between the period of 1961-1970 over 2,000 contractual
agreements on the transfer of technology were made between five
of the industrial countries of the LDCs. The contracts show
the nature of restriction, especially on exports (see table
12). The data in this table shows a wide variation in the
nature of the restrictions imposed on LDCs. These restrictions
TABLE 12
CONTRACTS CONTAINING RESTRICTIVE EXPORT CLAUSES,






















Percentage of total nunber
of restrictive contracts
Peru 100 99 99 90 10
PfexLcx) 109 106 99 62 4 34
Chile 125 162 99 38
Bolivia 35 29 83 93 7
Colottbia 117 92 79 98 2
Ecuador 12 9 75 100
India 1051 455 48 40 53 7
Philippines 254 82 32 81 6 13
Argentina 60 17 28 53 47
Israel
1961-1963 144 16 11 100
1964-1965 150 9 6 100
Source: UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries (New York, 1975), p. 20.
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have been into three major categories:
1) Total prohibition of exports or requirement
of prior approval.
2) Export permitted to certain comtries and
prohibited to others.
3) Other forms of restriction.
The countries in table 12 are listed in descending
order of the proportion of agreements containing such restric¬
tive clauses. These proportions vary from as much as 99 percent
in Peru, 93 percent in Chile to as little as 6 percent in Israel.
India and the Philippines are in an intermediate position.
Table 13 shows the contractual agreements containing
the restrictive export clauses, classified by industry. For
example, it seems that there is a high proportion of contracts
containing restrictive exports clauses in the pharmaceutical
industry in Peru, Bolivia, Colombia, and the Philippines. In
India and the Philippines, the proportion is also very high for
the electrical goods and the machinery sector.
The Restriction of Competition
Technology suppliers have been very anxious to protect
their market interests in LDCs, and have employed several methods
to eliminate competition. Therefore, some agreements oblige the
enterprise not to engage in the manufacture and sale of products
other than those covered by the license or to diversify or
expand into other lines. In India only 65 out of 1051 effective
contracts were approved have non-restriction up to 1964. In the
Philippines 5 out of 254 agreements in 1970 had such restrictive
28
TABLE 13
CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS CONTAINING RESTRICTIVE CLAUSES,
CLASSIFIED BY INDUSTRY (Percentage of total
agreements in the industry specified)
Industry India Philippines Argentina Colonbia Bolivia Peru
Food 16
Tobacco 100 29
Beverages 11 92 35
Textiles 25 60
Building materials 50 30
Mstal products 39
Chemicals 25 35 29 61
Hiarmaceuticals 29 52 81 80 100
Madunery and tools 52 43
Electrical goods
and machinery 55 45 40
Transport equipment 53 14 40
Other 43 31 39 92 93
Total 48 32
Source: UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries (New York, 1975), p. 20.
conditions, while in Mexico 19 out of 109 agreements in 1969
13also had such conditions.
Let us now show a specific instance of restrictive prac¬
tices by DCs to eliminate competition. A good example of this is
the technological search carried out in Mexico for Caprolactama
to manufacture a fibre called "Nylon G." The local investor did
not have access to large financial resources and wished to pro¬
duce on a relatively small scale to meet the demand from his own
^^UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of Tech¬
nology to Developing Countries (New York: United Nations Publica¬
tion, 1975), p. 22.
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textile factory. As often happens, the investor contacted the
main producer of this fibre in the world, a United States
enterprise, which refused him the technology owing to the
reduced scale of his plant.
The recent contractual agreements between Saudi Arabia
and the U.S. petrochemical companies, that would produce 3.2
million metric tons in net basic petrochemical production
between 1983 and 1985, shows some unfavorable terms and restric¬
tive clauses. These clauses would restrict Saudi Arabia from
competing in the world market of petrochemicals.
Forbes Magazine, in its 33rd annual report on American
industry (January 5, 1981), reported that the American petro¬
chemical producers have little to worry about from upcoming
Middle East conpetition. A look at the agreements between Shell
and Saudi Arabian government, as it was demonstrated in Forbes
Magazine,will underline the vmfavorable terms that associated
with this agreement, for example:
1) Saudi Arabia, in 1985, will receive rights to market
only 50 percent of the final product even though it is providing
70 percent or 2.1 billion for financing the complex. Shell will
receive the right to the remaining 50 percent. Add to that.
Shell will probably get on the order of 200,000 barrels of crude
a day, which it can use as a source for its petrochemical plants
14
UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by
Developing Coxmtries (New York: UNCTAD Publication. 1978)7 p. 14.
^^Jane Carmichael, "Chemicals," Forbes. 33rd Annual
Report on American Industry (January 5, 1981), pp. 198-199.
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at home.
All of this is considered to be the price tag for
Shell's technology and marketing training.
2) The 1.6 million metric tons a year of ethylene,
ethylenedichloride, styrene are just basic petrochemicals used
as building blocks for more conqjlex products as polystyrene and
vinycloride monomer (a product of plastic). Shell plans to
bring most of the primary chemical products back to its own
plants in the U.S. to be refined into higher products.
3) Saudi Arabia will have only 4 percent of the world
market of petrochemical. But, American producers are still
worried; they think that even 4 percent or 5 percent, if it
comes during a period of oversupply, could disrupt world prices
of petrochemical for a short time. Forbes Magazine, on the
same report, quoted Mr. J. E. Mitchell of Dow Chemical, who as
director of corporate planning has been following negotiations
for Dow's joint venture with the Saudis. He eii5)hasi2e his
attitude toward the upcoming Saudi competition by saying;
If all plants came in the same year, there's no
question but there would be some disruption, but I
don't think the earliest plant will be in mtil
1985, and the rest will spread out between 1985 and
1990.
Again, it seems here that even though the petrochemical
industry in the Middle East is on its first step, the indus¬
trial coxantries are still worried from that upcoming competi¬
tion. This is just another example of what the industrial
development faces in the LDCs.
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Factors Influencing the Selection of
I*articular Technology In LDCF
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are the best channels
for transferring technology to poor coimt^’ies because of their
global organizational skills. Their ability mobolize resources
quickly, and their massive investment in R&D.^^ It is well
known that the central characteristic of MNCs is that it seeks
to maximize the profits not of its individual subsidiaries, but
rather of the center parent company.The only way for MNCs
to maximize their profits is to minimize the cost of production.
If this does not happen within their original bases, they shift
the production out where there is cheap labor. This action
will maximize profit and keep MNCs conpetitive along the lines.
This attitude no doubt affects the quality of technology LDCs
are receiving from DCs.
In 1974, the U.N. (Department of Economic and Social
Affairs) issued a report concerning MNCs and their affiliates
in LDCs. This report examines the factor that influences the
selection of a particular technology by a particular kind of
18
enterprise in LDCs. A number of these studies in the report
are concerned explicitly with the behavior of the MNCs
16
Denis Goulet, The Uncertain Promice; Valxae Conflicts
in Technology Transfer (New York: I.O.D.C., 1977), p. BTjT;
^^Ronald Muller, "The Multinational Corporation and the
Underdevelopment of the Third World," in The Political Economy
of Development and Underdevelopment, ed. Charles K. Wilber (New
York: The Random House, 197S), p. TSl.
18
U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The
Acquisition of Technology from Multinational Corporations (New
York: U.N. Publications7 1974), p. 9^
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enterprise that are based in the U.S.A. and its affiliates
in LDCs.
The study has found that the price elasticity of
demand for the firm's product and the degree of competition
facing the MNCs, are the major indicators for the selection
of the particular technology in LDCs. Therefore, the more
elastic the demand for a particular product, the more the
technology selected in LDCs differed from that used by the
firm in the U.S.A. In other words, the more elastic the demand
for the particular product, the more labour intensive techno¬
logy will be used to produce that product. In this case, the
technology used in LDCs will differ from that used by the firm
in the U.S.A. This was the finding of the U.N. Department of
Economic and Social Affairs.
It seems here that the transfer of technology from
DCs to LDCs takes place in order for MNCs (the suppliers of
technology) to have access to cheap low level labor (see table
14), which results in cost minimizing or profit maximizing for
MNCs. The actual contribution to skill formation that is
needed in LDCs is limited.
Table 14 shows the average hourly earnings of works
processing or assembling U.S. materials overseas and in the
U.S.A. It also shows the enormous differences in labour cost
of which advantage can be taken by an international firm.
For example, the average hourly earning of a Korean worker
how processing or assembling U.S. materials (office machine
plants) in Korea is $0.28. On the other hand, the average
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TABLE 14
AVERAGE HOURLY EARNINGS OF WORKERS PROCESSING OR ASSEMBLING
U.S. MATERIALS OVERSEAS AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Average hotjrly Average hourly Ratio of U.S.
earnings abroad* U.S. earnings earnings to
(dollars) (dollars) earnings abroad
Consumer electronic
products
Hong Kong 0.27 3.13 11.8
Mexico 0,53 2.31 4.4
Taiwan 0.14 2.56 18.2
Office machine parts ;
Hong Kong 0.30 2.92 9.7
l^xico 0.48 2.97 6.2
Korea 0.28 2.78 10.1
Singapore 0.29 3.36 11.6
Taiwan 0.38 3.67 9.8
Semiconductors
Hong Kcng 0.28 2.84 10.3
Jamaica 0.30 2.23 7.4
I^xico 0.61 2.56 4.2
Netherlands Antilles 0.72 3.33 4.6
Korea 0.33 3.32 10.2
Singapore 0.29 3.36 11.6
Wearing Apparel
British Honduras 0.28 2.11 7.5
Costa Rica 0.34 2.28 6.7
Honduras 0.45 2.27 5.0
Mexico 0.53 2.29 4.3
Trim’ dad 0.40 2.49 6.3
Notes:
^Including supplementary compensation.
+Including supplementary co^ensation. Estimates by firms
of earning for comparable job,
SOURCE: United States Tariff Commission, Economic Factors
Affecting the Use of Items 807.00 and 506.30 of the Tariff
Schedule of the United States (Washington, l970).
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hourly earnings of an American worker in the U.S.A., doing the
same job is $2,78.
Therefore, it can be argued that there is a need for
coherent policy in this area, a policy that will ensure that
LDCs receive the maximimi benefits possible from transferring
technology.
The Price of Technology Transfer to
Less Developing Countries
An estimate by UNCTAD of the direct cost of technology
transfer to LDCs, covering payment, licensing, trademark, and
consultancy services, shows that by the end of the 1960s the
costs had reached as much as $1500 million. These payments
could well have grown six-fold, about $9 billion by 1980 (see
table 15).
These direct costs at (tablei6) were about 8 percent
of LDCs' imports of machinery, equipment and chemicals. They
were as much as 37 percent of public debt service payments
and 56 percent of the annual flow of direct foreign investment.
This expensive commodity places indeed a heavy load on
the external public debt of LDCs. The World Bank estimated
that the external public debt of ninety-six LDCs increased by
$51 billion or about 25 percent in 1978 to a total of $235
billion.
Table 16 shows in detail, the pajnnents by LDCs for the
transfer of technology and their relationship to GDP and
^^World Bank, 1979 Annual Report, p. 14.
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TABLE 15
DIRECT COSTS OF TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN COMPARISON




Value p^mients for transfer
(millions of of technology
dollars) (percent)
Outflows
1. Direct payments for transfer of
technology patents, licenses,
know-hcw, trademarks, and
management and other technical
services) 1,500 100
2. Technology-related payments
(a) Inports (a.a.f.) of machi¬
nery and equipment
(excluding passenger vehicles)
and of chemicals 18,420 8
(b) Profit cn direct foreigi
investment (excluciing
oil-producing countries) 1,721 87
3. Service payments on external
public debt 4,022 37
Inflews
4. Non-petroleum esqjorts (f.o.b.) 29,350 5
5. Total official flows 6,710 22
6. Direct foreign investment
(including reinvested earnings) ... 2,700 56
Source: UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising from the Transfer of
Technology to Developing Countries (New York: U.N. Publications.
1975), pT 26.
TABLE 16
i^yraents^ by developing countries for the transfer of technology and their relationship to GDP and exports
Payments for transfer of




























(Millions of dollars) (Billions ofdollars) (Per cent)
Latin America:
Argentina .... 1970 70.5 45.3 115.8 23.4b 1.8 0.49 6.5
Brazil .... 1970 104.0 35.3 2.7 0.29 3.8
Chile .... 1969 8.2 (8.2) 6.1 1.1 0.13 0.8
Colombia .... 1966 26.7 5.4 0.5 0.49 5.3
Mexico .... 1968 200.0 27.1 1.3 0.74 15.9
Peru .... 1971 9.9 1.1 11.0 5.8b 0.9 0.19 1.2
Venezuela .... 1966 14.8 (14.8) 8.8 2.7 0.17 0.5
Sub-total (480.5) 111.9 10.9 0.43 4.4
Africa:
Nigeria .... 1965 19.0 14.8 33.8 4.7 0.8 0.72 4.5
Asia:
India .... 1969 6.4 43.2 49.6 49.1 1.8 0.1 2,7
Indonesia .... 1968 25.0 (25.0) 11.0 0.7 0.23 3.6
-iao, .... 1970 3.3 AU 44 0.03 04
Israel . . . .1961-1965C 1.6 2.3 T9 2.6 0.3 0.15 1.2
Republic of Korea .... 1970 2.1 (2.1) 8.1 0.8 0.03 0.3
Pakistan . . . .1965-1970': 2.1 (100) (102.1) 14.5 0.6 0.7 15.7
Sri Lanka .... 1970 0.1 9.2 9.3 2.2 0.3 0.42 2.7
Sub-total 39.0 (156.3) (195.3) 98.7 7.0 0.2 2.8
Southern Europe:
Greece .... 1966 2.6 6.4 0.4 0.04 0.6
Spain .... 1970 81.6 52.2 133.8 32.4 2.4 0.41 5.6
Turkey .... 1968 49.1 12.6 0.5 0.39 9.9
Yugoslavia .... 1970 5.4 (5.4) 12.3 1.7 0.04 0.3
Sub-total (190.9) 63.7 5.0 0.3 3.8
TOTAL, excluding
Southern Europe 709.6 215.3 18.7 0.33 3.8
TOTAL, including
Southern Europe 900.5 279.0 23.7 0.32 3.8
Sources: Replies to the UNCTAD secretariat's questionnaire and
other sources shown in the annex to document TD/I06, loc. cit.
(cf. foot-note 4 above). For Venezuela: Oficina Central de Coordi-
nacion y Planificiacion (CORDIPLAN), Departamento Industrial,
II Encuesta Industrial: Documento Bdsico (Caracas, November
1968).
NOTE. Parentheses indicate that the information available is
incomplete.
* In most cases payments refer to the foreign exchange cost (I
dollars, at current prices) of the transfer. For further details, see th
annex to document TD/106,/oc. cit. (cf. foot-note 4 above).
^ UNCTAD secretariat estimate.
^ Annual average.
Sources; UNCTAD, Major Issues Arising From the Transfer of Technology
to Developing Countries (New York: U.N. Publicatinn, ^Q7S^
p. 26.
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exports for selected countries. For exaii5)le, Pakistan, during
the period of 1965-1970 paid a total of $102.1 million, its
-GDP was $14.5 billions, its exports was $0.6 billion. The
pa5rment for transfer of technology as proportion of GDP was
0.7 percent, and 15.7 percent as proportion of its exports,
which is considerable high in comparison to Greece, Spain, or
Israel. In Spain, the payments for transfer of technology as
proportion of its exports is 5.6 percent, in Greece it is
0.6 percent, in Israel it is 1.2 percent.
Let us now look at the relationship between the annual
average growth rate of payments for transfer of technology (PTT)
and the annual average growth rate of manufacturing output (MO)
in select coxantries for the period of 1953-1970 (see table 17).
In Nigeria (PTT) or (55.5) is equal to 6.0; this means 6 PTT
MO ~971
for each 1 MO. In Argentina the ratio is 5.4, Sri Lanka 4.2,
India 2.6. Those ratios seem to be significant compared to
1.2 in Spain, for example. Table 17 tends to indicate that the
more advanced is the level of development of the LDC, the lower
will be the ratio of PTT to MO and vice versa.
It seems here that the annual average growth rate of
manufacturing output in LDCs is not catching up with the annual
average growth rate of payments for transfer of technology. In
other words, their pa3mients on the purchase of technology is
higher than their income from its sale.
TABLE 17
Relationship between increase in payments for transfer of technology,
manufacturing output and GDP for selected countries
Relationship




transfer of payments manu-
technology for fttctu- MO GDP
transfer of ring (Le. column (i.e. column
initial End technology output real 3 divided divided by
Country Period year year (PTTi (MO! COP by column 4; column Sj
H) (2) (S) <4) (5) (6) (7)
Developing countries
dollars ' Per cent per year Ratios
Nigeria 1963-1965 13.8 33.8 55.5 9.3» 4.0 6.0 13.9
Korea (Republic ofj . 1967-1970 0.7 2.1 43.0 24.2 12.5‘> 1.8 3.4
Sri Lanka 1965-1970 2.0 9.2 36.0 8.6«'<* 3.9 4.2 9.2
Argentina 1965-1970 35.1 115.8 26.9 5.0 3.9': 5.4 6.9
Brazil 1965-1969 42.5 91.0 20.9 9.7d 6.2 2.1 3.4
India 1959-1969 12.0 49.6 15.2 5.8 9 2^ 2.6 1.7
Mexico 1953-1968 14.7f 120.0f 15.0 8.5 6.78 1.8 2.2
Iran 1965-1970 " M iJ lOJ \Ll lOAC 0.9 1.0
Other technology-
receiving countries
Turkcv 1964-1968 6.2 49 1 65.5 10.5a 6.6 6.2 9.9
Yugoslavia 1965-1970 0.6 5.4 50.5 6.3 5.3c 8.0 9.5
Ireland 1963-1969 0.2 2.2 49.0 6.6 4.3 7.4 11.4
Greece 1959-1966 0.7 2.6 19.8 8.6» 9.4*’ 2.3 2.1
Spain 1965-1969 79.9 133.0 13.6 11.0 6.5 1.2 2.1
Developed market- Receipts from developing countries
economy countries for the transfer of technology
France'
Germany (Federal
1967-1969 23.7 32.2 17.8
Republic of>) . . . . 1963-1969 50.3 105.4 13.1
Belgium
United States
1966-1970 5.6 8.8 11.6
of America . . . , 1960-1969 175.6 442.3 10.8
United Kingdom*^ . . 1965-1969 19.6 29.3 10.6
Sweden 1965-1970 0.2 0.2 1.9
Japan* 1968-1969 12.4 11.3 -
Sources As for table 17, p, 29.
NOTE. Countries in each group have been arranged in descending
order of their annual growth rates of payments for the transfer of
technology.









' Excluding S36.4 million in lump-sum receipts in the petroleum
sector from the Algerian Government.
1 Receipts from developed and developing countries.
Excluding receipts by petroleum companies, including receipts
from Southern European countries.
* For the period 1963-1968 Japan’s receipts from all countries,
developed and developing, rose from $9.1 to $34 million for an
annual growth rate of 30 per cent, according to figures shown by
T. Orawa, Transfer of Technology from Japan to Developing
Countries, UNITAR Research Report No. 7 (New York, 1971).
CHAPTER 3
THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE
REVERSE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
This chapter is concerned with the problem of the mig¬
ration of skilled personnel from LDCs to DCs. In the last two
chapters we have shown the importance of technology in trade
and development. Also, we have shown the existent number of
engineers and scientists engaging in research and development;
they were 10.4 per 10,000 in the developed market economy, 0.35
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in Africa, 1.6 in Asia, 1.15 in Latin America. That by it¬
self reflects an enormous weakness in the technological infra¬
structure in LDCs. The phenomenon of "reverse transfer of
technology" or "brain drain" makes it harder for LDCs to build
a strong base for their industrial development. The concern of
UNCTAD with the "reverse transfer of technology" dates back to
the third session of the conference in Santiago de Chile in
May 1972, in resolution 39 (III) the conference requested
UNCTAD to contribute to the studies being carried out on the
outclox7 on trained personnel from LDCs which constitutes a
21
reverse transfer of technology.
^°See table 1.
21
UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey
of Its Main Features. Causes and Policy ImTJlica'tion (New York:
United Nations Publication, 1979), p. 1.
39
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Magnitude of Skill Flows from LDCs to DCs
The immigration policies in the United States and
Canada referred to in the UNCTAD study as discrimination in
favour of professionals over other immigrants and as having
selectively reduced barriers to entry applying to professional
22
immigrants from the developing countries.
Estimates made earlier by the UNCTAD secretariat show
that between 1960 and 1972 skilled migration from the developing
countries (consisting of engineers, scientists, surgeons and
physicians and technical and kindred workers) to the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom, reached about 230,000
persons. If one adds to this a flow of about 29,000 to the
United States during 1973-1975 and 25,000 to Canada during 1973-
1976, this makes a total figure of nearly 285,000 (see table
18) . The developing countries provided the United States 77-80
percent of the skilled migrants between 1973-1974.
Table 19 gives a detailed examination of the occupa¬
tional composition of skilled migration. For example, physicians
and surgeons have been the most significant category of develop¬
ing country immigrants into the United States, Canada and the
United Kingdom constituting 60 percent of the overall immigra¬
tion in this category to these three countries (72 percent in
the United States, 49 percent in the United Kingdom and 37 per¬
cent in Canada). Engineers and scientists have been the second
most important category, representing 43 percent of overall
22
UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology (New York:
United Nations Publication, 1979), p. 4.
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TABLE 18
TRENDS IN SKILLED MIGRATION FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CANADA AND THE
UNITED KINGDOM, 1961-1976




Year(s) of America Canada Kingdom Total
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of developing




of America Canada Kingdom
(5) (6) (7)
1961-1965 14,514 (6,147)° (20,411)° (41,072) 37 20 26
1966 7,635 5,930 10,812 24,277 49 23 26
1967 8,239 8,614 8,156 25,009 52 25 21
1968 8,052 7,489 9,418 24,959 50 24 23
1969 8,419 8,286 9,932 26,637 64 28 22
1970 11,412 6,867 8,635 26,914 69 27 19
1971 16,098 6,195 7,843 30,136 85 31 18
1972 15,822 7,070 8,833 31,725 ^ 86 36 19
1973 10,602 6,180 (16,782)° 77 25 15
1974 8,725 7,631 (16,356)<^ 80 27 15
1975 9,298 6,362 (15,660)d 72 25 14
1976 • • 4,842 (4,842)e • • 24
Cumulative
total 118,816 (81,613) (84,040) (284,469) 61 26 22
Sources: TD/B/C6/7, table 1; for the United States:, unpublished data
supplied by the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.; for Canada:
Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Statistics.
The concept of skilled migration used is wider for Canada and the United
Kingdom than for the United States. The United States figures invlude only the
"professional" categories (i.e., engineers, natural and social scientists and
doctors) whereas figures for the United Kingdom and Canada include "profes¬
sional, technical and kindred workers."
b
Total for 1963-1965 only.
^Total for 1964-1965 only.
‘^Total for the United States and Canada only.
e
Total for Canada only.
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TABLE 19
SHARE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN TOTAL SKILLED MIGRATION
INTO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CANADA AND
THE UNITED KINGDOM, TOTAL 1961-1976
Number of













United States of America^ 118,816 190,813 62
Physicians and surgeons 40,876 56,447 72
Engineers and scientists 77,279 133,478 58
All others^ 661 888 74
Canada‘S 81,613 297,211 27
Physicians, surgeons and
scientists 4,850 13,023 37
Engineers and scientists 13,601 42,711 32
All others 63,162 241,477 26
United Kingdom® 84,040 380,751 22
Physicians, surgeons and
dentists 15,655 32.065 49
Engineers and scientists 9,225 54,705 17
All others 59,160 293,981 20
Total 284,469 868,775 33
Physicians, surgeons and
dentists 61,381 101,535 60
Engineers and scientists 100,105 230,894 43
All others 122,983 536,346 23
Sources: TD/B/C6/7, table 3; for the United States: unpublished data
supplied by the National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C.; for Canada:
Department of Manpower and Immigration, Immigration Statistics.
®The concept of skilled migration used is wider for Canada and the






immigration in this category into developed countries (58 per¬
cent in the United States, 32 percent in Canada and 17 percent
in the United Kingdom). In terms of absolute flows, nearly
61,000 physicians and surgeons, over 100,000 engineers and
scientists and 123,000 technical and kindred workers migrated
from developing countries to the developed countries between
1961 and 1976.
Let us now measure in terms of dollars the capital
value of skill flow from developing countries to the United
States of America, Canada and the United Kingdom between 1961-
1972 (see table 20) . Coltmin 1 shows the total numbers of
developing country skilled migrants in the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom, broken down by skill categories.
Column 2 gives estimates of imputed capital value on a per
migrant basis. Coltimn 3 multiplies the per migrant figures by
the total migration flows. The flows to the United States
amounting to over $28 billion, to Canada about $10 billion, and
to the United Kingdom about $5 billion. The combined imputed
capital value of skill transfer in the three countries was
about $42 billion (1961-1972), or in annual average terms about
$3.5 billion per year.
Table 21 shows the contribution to the U.S. net income
gain by LDCs from skilled immigration into the U.S. The income
from work and services of highly skilled personnel who migrated
to the U.S. from LDCs reached about $3.7 billion in 1970.
This figure accounts for over 0.3 percent of U.S. GDP, about 14
percent of the total U.S. expenditures on research and
44
TABLE 20
MEASURES OF IMPUTED CAPITAL VALUE OF SKILL FLOWS FROM
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,




















United States of America
(1961-1972) 90,191 313 28,233
Engineers 43,626 227 9,889
Scientists'^ 29,464 198 3,850
Doctors'^ 27,100 535'^ 14,494
Canada (1963-1972) 56,598 169 9,556
Engineers 6,377 213 1,358
Scientists® 3,394 214 728
Doctors 4,049 385 1,560
Others^ 42,778 138 5,910
United Kingdom (1964-1972) 84,040 55 4,603
Engineers 6,735 63 425
Scientists 2,490 64 160
Doctors 15,655 68 1,073
OthersS 59,160 50 2,945
Grant total 230,829 184 42,392
Annual average 19,236 184 3,533
Source; TD/B/C.6/7: for figures in columb 1, tables A-5, A-9 and A-12,
for figures in columb 2, the Yp rows in tables 9, 10, and 11.
^Average values weighted by migration flows in each category, each year.
“Social and natural scientists.
'^Physicians and surgeons.
^Averages for physicians, surgeons and dentists.
^Natural scientists and biologists and agricultural professionals.
^Professors and principals, teachers, nurses, medical technicians and
managerial and other professionals.
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Asia 8.993 1,809.1 1,092.4 2,091.5
India 3,141 718.2 156.3 874.5
Philippines 2,318 383.8 496.8 880.6
Korea (Republic of) 541 77.5 147.3 224.8
liong Kong 262 54.8 26.5 81.3
Other 1,797 400.6 116.3 516.9
Near and Middle East 934 174.2 149.2 323.4
Africa 1,212 252.2 121.4 373.6
Latin America 1,031 172.4 214.5 386.9
Cuba 114 15.3 33.6 o^cc
Columbia 114 19.2 23.3 42.5
Mexico 92 15.5 18.7 34.2
Argentina 72 10.1 20.7 30.8
Brazil 70 15.5 4.5 20.0
Peru 41 6.9 8.4 15.3
Venezuela 42 7.6 7.1 14.7
Chile 33 5.4 7.1 12.5
Ecuador 32 4.4 9.0 13.4
Bolivia 24 2.2 9.7 11.9
Other 396 70.0 72.4 142.4
Developing Countries
Total 11,236 2,233.7 1,428.3 3,662.0
SOURCE: Figures in column (1) obtained from Table B-1 of Scientists,
Engineers and Physicians from Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal
Year, 1970, National Scientist Foundation (Washington, D. C.:
June 1972), publication NSF 72-312.
NOTE: Figures in colunms (2) and (3) were estimated by multiplying number
of immigrants into the United States from each developing country by
the net income gained per immigrant presented in column (3) of
Table 2 above.
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development and about 39 percent of U.S. current expenditures
23
on higher education.
The Causes of Migration
Studies relating to the question of the causes of brain
drain have been compiled or commissioned by the secretariats of
the United Nations and other international agencies, including
ILO and WHO. The causes of the voluntary migrant can be most
clearly elaborated within the context of three bro.ad categories
9 /
of motivation.
1. Income differentials between LDCs and DCs
and other related economic consideration
have been most often as a main cause of
the brain drain.
2. Working conditions and professional oppor¬
tunities may also have some affect on migra¬
tion decisions. Lack of infrastructure in
the form of equipment, instruments, libraries,
etc. in home countries is one of the reasons
why developing countries professinals have
wanted to pursue their research interests in
developed country institutions.
3. The effect of social conditions could include
anything from the stability of the political
and social environment to the availability of
particular consumer goods.
Some Policy Issues for Action
It was clearly recognized by the group of government
experts on reverse transfer of technology that concerted
efforts were needed to assist the developing comtries in
9 3
UNCTAD, Reverse Transfer of Technology; Economic
Effects of the Brain Drain (New York: UNCTAD Publications. 1975^,
p. 2.
^^UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey
of Its Main Features, Causes and Policy Implication (New York:
U.N. Publication, 1979), p. 9.
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finding solutions to the problem of reverse transfer of techno¬
logy (brain drain). A good deal of the responsibilities with
the industrialized countries, however, they prefen to use high-
level manpower from less developed countries because of the
lower cost involved and fewer difficulties encountered if employ¬
ment has to be terminated in the event of decrease in demand or
financial austerity. Several alternative proposals have been
2 ft
advanced in recent years and they fall into two main groups:
(i) Proposal requiring action by the LDCs.
(ii) Proposal requiring action by the DCs.
A. Action by the Developing Countries
Measures to be taken by developing comtries can
be separated into three main categories: (i)
"insensitive policies" to encourage professionals
to stay in their home countries or to return from
abroad, (ii) "restrictive policies" aimed at dis¬
couraging professionals from leaving their coun¬
try; and (iii) "delinking policies" intended to
"indigenize" the educational system in developing
countries so as to minimize the need or desire of
professionals to go abroad.
B. Action by the Developed Countries
Traditionally, the measure most commonly adopted
by developed countries has been to limit the
entry of developing country professionals and to
control the composition of migraton through the
application of immigration quotas on a selective
basis. Several other useful suggestions have
been made where action by developed countries
could prove of value:
(a) The developed countries could reorient
aid or technical assistance programs
to strengthen educational institutions
^F. J. Van Hoek, The Migration of High Level Manpower
from Developing to Developed Countries (Paris: Mouton. 1970),
p. 39.
2ft
UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology, p. 18.
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in LDCs and to encourage the absorption
of trained personnel within these
countries;
(b) As a related measure, they could set up
and support funds which promote the under¬
taking of research and training activities
in the institution of developing countries
and encourage greater use of skilled pro¬
fessionals and consultants of developing
countries in programmes or projects funded
by DCs sources.
The previous review of the concern of UNCTAD with
reverse transfer of technology shows the importance that is
being attached to this problem and the extent of the work needed
to be accomplished in this area.
CHAPTER 4
THE NEO-TECHNOLOGY HYPOTHESIS OF THE PATTERN OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER FROM DCs TO LDCs
In this chapter we shall focus on the neo-technology
hypothesis of the pattern of international trade with regard to
the restrictive practices by DCs in the area of technology
transfer to LDCs and the phenomena of "brain drain,"
The neo-technology hypothesis attempts to explain the
pattern of international trade on the basis of comparative
advantage that originates in technological progress. The main
proponents of this hypothesis are: Posner (1961), Hufbauer
(1966), Johnson (1968), and Vernon (1966).“'
The so-called "product-cycle" theory was formulated
28
by Vernon in 1966. It was the first fully articulated state¬
ment concerning the neo-technology hypothesis in international
trade. The hypothesis deals primarily with the invention and
innovation of new products and it states clearly that foreign
27
Jitendralal Bokakti, "Some Welfare Implication of the
Neo-technology Hypothesis of the Pattern of International Trade,"
Oxford Economic Paper, vol. 23, no. 3 (November 1975):383.
28
R. Vernon, "International Investment and International




investment is the main route for transmitting technology.
In the first half of the chapter, an attempt will be
made to explain the theory of the product cycle in detail, with
special attention to its inplications on the existing technolo¬
gical gap between DCs and LDCs. The second half of the chapter
will show some of the efforts on the part of LDCs to narrow the
technological gap between them and the developed countries.
The Theory of the Product Cycle
The purpose of this chapter is to take a new look at
the product cycle model of international trade as developed by
Raymond Vernon. This theory enploys the technological diffe¬
rential between the countries to explain the trade patterns,
particularly where new goods are being introduced such as those
embodied in scientists and engineers (conputers, electronics,
nuclear energy, space equipment, and aircraft).
The country that has a technological lead will maintain
a comparative advantage in its exports, but after a period of
time, this export advantage disappears when the technological
lead is lost or narrows. For example, it has been found that
U.S. exports have had a high technological component and that
many of these exports diminish or disappear when the technolo-
30
gical lead of the Ikiited States narrows or is lost.
^^Jitendralal Brokakti, "Some Welfare Inplications of
the Neo-technology Hypothesis of the Pattern of International
Trade," Oxford Economic Paper, vol. 23, no. 3 (November 1975);
385 .
30
Kindleberger and Lindert, International Economics
(Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1978), p^ 76”!
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Trade in this case seems to be based to a great extent
on a technological gap created by the invention and marketing
of new products. The basic premise upon which Vernon's model
is founded is that as the product cycle (life cycle) of any
new commodity unfolds, its production passes through successive
stages of standardization, and associated with it will be dy¬
namic shifts in comparative advantage of predictable direc-
31
tion. The product is first new, then matures as it goes to
other industrialized countries, and finally is standardized.
Computers are at one end of the line today, and leather goods,
rubber products, paper and textiles are at the other end.
The trade pattern over the life cycle of a new pro¬
duct is illustrated in Figure 5. In the first stage of develop¬
ment, with time measured along the horizontal axis, the new
product starts in, say the United States, at time t^. After
a while, at t^, the United States begins to export some of the
new product to other industrial countries. Then after a period
of time, these countries develop their own ability to produce
the new good by a successful imitation. The increasing imita¬
tion by other industrial countries makes them net exporters of
the products at time t^ in figure 5. As the technology in this
product line ages and becomes increasingly standardized, the
United States loses its comparative advantage and becomes a
net importer of this good at t^. It is also possible in this
31
Michael P. Claudon, International Trade and Techno-
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977),
P
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tc: Rest of the
world becomes
a net exporter
Source: Kindleberger and Lindert, International Economics
(Richard D. Irwin, Inc. , 1978) , p. TT.
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case to expect that the rest of the world, including the LDCs,
can also catch up in time with the technological knowledge of
Europe, Canada, and Japan in this aging product line. At t^,
the product cycle enters its final phase as far as trade is
concerned, with the product being exported from the rest of
the world (for example, from less developed countries) to the
U.S.A. and other higher-income countries. What makes the
mature product settle in less developed countries is their
32
wage-rate advantage. In other words, the wage rate advan¬
tage makes this product line a comparative advantage export item
33for less developed countries. As long as the leader in this
case, the U.S.A., keeps coming up with new goods to introduce
into world trade, and as long as it maintains a monopoly of
the knowledge needed to make the new product for longer periods,
it can then retain its comparative advantage for longer periods
of time.
Figure 5 shows that LDCs are the last to get the new
technology. That indeed confirms the LDCs allegation against
DCs in the area of technology transfer. The theory of the
product cycle by itself requires the existence of a technolo¬
gical gap between countries in order for trade to circulate
between them.
Chapters 2 and 3 of the study has shown conclusively
that DCs have done many things to keep the technological gap
^^See table 14.
O O
Kindleberger and Lindert, International Economics
(Homewood, Illinois: Irwin, 1978), pp"! 77-78.
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continually wide between them and LDCs. The restrictive prac¬
tices that are associated with the transfer of technology, the
high price of technology and finally the encouraging of the
brain drain are but few examples. Mr. J, Fred Bucy, President
of Texas Instruments, says:
Today our toughest conqjetition is coming from foreign
conpanies whose ability to compete with us rests in
part on their acquisition of U.S. technology .... The
time has come to stop selling our latest technologies,
which are the most valuable things we've got.
Mr. Bucy's words indeed shed light on the mfair relationship
between DCs and LDCs in the area of technology transfer and
proves DCs’ attempts to maintain the technological gap in
their favor.
It seems clear now that the theory of the product
cycle does not only show the pattern of trade between countries,
but also explains the reasons behind DCs restrictive technology
transfer policy.
LDCs Efforts to Narrow the Technological Gap
The inequities in the present international economic
system was what led the "group of 77" to latmch an official
campaign for a new international economic order in 1974. The
group of 77 cante into being within the framework of UNCTAD I
in 1964. The official call for a NIEO is manifested in four
United Nations resolutions passed since May 1974.^^
^^Forttme (May 22, 1978), p. 106.
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U.N. General Assembly, Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and
3202 (S-VII), May 1, 1974, and Resolutions 3281 (XXIX), Decem¬
ber 12, 1974, and Resolutions 3262 (S-VIII), September 16, 1975.
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(i) The "Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order," adopted
May 16, 1974.
(ii) The "Programme of Action on the Establish¬
ment of a New International Economic Order,"
adopted May 16, 1974.
(iii) The "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States," adopted December 12, 1974.
(iv) Resolution on "Development and International
Economic Co-operation," adopted September
16, 1975.
The less developed countries have offered eight major
proposals to correct the inequality in the present interna¬
tional economic system. These eight major proposals are in¬
cluded in the "Programme of Action on the Establishment of
New International Economic Order." One of these proposals
addresses the question of the technology transfer between DCs
and LDCs.
The NIEO Proposal on the Transfer of Technology
The NIEO proposal on the "transfer of technology"
states that:
All efforts should be made:
(a) To formulate an international Code of Conduct
for the transfer of technology corresponding
to needs and condition, prevalent in develop¬
ing countries;
(b) To give access on improved terms to modem
technology and to adopt that technology, as
appropriate, to specific economic, social and
ecological conditions and varying stages of
development in developing countries;
(c) To e3q)and significantly the assistance from
developed to developing covmtries in research
and development programmes and in the creation
of suitable indigenous technology;
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(d) To adopt commercial practices governing trans¬
fer of technology to the requirements of the
developing covintries and to prevent abuse of
the rights of sellers;
(e) To promote international co-operation in
research and development in exploration and
exploitation, conservation and the legitimate
utilization of natural resources and all
sources of energy.
UNCTAD at its fourth session, held in Nairobi in 1976,
decided in resolution 87 (IV), that an Advisory Service on
the Transfer of Technology (ASST) should be established.
Major Areas of Activity of UNCTAD's Advisory
Service and Example of Activities Already
Undertaken
The Advisory Service co-operates with and assists the
developing countries in:^^
(a) The preparation of national technology policies
and plans and their in^ilementation in co¬
ordination with other relevant economic poli¬
cies and plans;
(b) The establishment of national centers for the
transfer and development of technology, and
their links with other national bodies con¬
cerned in the process, as well as the produc¬
tive system, public and private;
(c) The establishment of subregional and regional
centers on transfer and development of tech¬
nology, and of appropriate linkages among
them, taking into account the varioxis sectors
of particular interest to developing countries;
(d) Dealing with the techno-economic, legal, com¬
mercial and developmental aspects of technology
arrangement;
(e) The evaluation of the economic and developmental
aspects of technological information, including
UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of Technology by
Developing Countries (New York: UNCTAD Publication. 1978)7 P- 57.
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patents and other forms of industrial property;
(f) The establishment of co-ordinated training pro¬
grammes at the national, subregional, regional
and interregional levels, seminars and ex¬
changes of government officials, dealing with
transfer and development of technology;
Exanples of activities already undertaken at
the request of government are given below.
(1) Establishment of Intitution and Formulation
of Policies at the National Level.
(2) Formulation of Policies and Establishment of Initu-
tional Machinery in Specific Sectors of Critical
Significance;
(3) Training Programmes, In-house Training Fellowships;
(4) Contribution to the preparatory process for the
United Nations Conference on Science and Technology
for Development (UNCSTD).
Another effort that has been made to narrow the tech¬
nological gap between DCs and LDCs is the conference that was
held at Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1978 by United Nation Con¬
ference on Technical Co-operation Among Developing Countries.
37
The following are some of the recommendations:
1) National programming for technical coopera¬
tion among developing countries;
2) Adoption of policies and regulations favorable
to technical co-operation among developing
countries;
3) The strengthening of national information system
for technical co-operation among developing
countries;
4) The iiDprovement of existing institutions;
5) Promotion of national research and training
o n
United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation
Among Developing Countries, Report of the United Nations Con¬
ference on Technical Co-operation Among Developing Comtries
(Biaenos Aires, 1978), p. 20.
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centers with multinational scope;
6) The promotion of greater technological self-
reliance in economic and social spheres;
7) Technical co-operation among developing cotm-
tries in the cultural spheres;
8) Control of the "brain drain" from developing
countries;
Collective self-reliance among developing countries
has become one of the more widely discussed notions in the
recent debate on international development strategies. Several
pronouncements made recently at the international level have
either put forward, or stipported, proposals
skill exchange among developing cotintries.




Prime Minister of Srilanka noted that there were several develop¬
ing countries that had
.... adequate financial resources to be invested in
development. However, a lack of skilled manpower
seems to be inhibiting the speedy take-off of develop¬
ment projects. On the other hand, there are cotmtries
... where, though they have the human resources,
they lack the capital for investment in industry. In
this context, it may be possible for trained manpower
resources from countries where these are available
to countries where their services are required. This
would promote regional co-operation of a new tjrpe.
More recently, in its resolution 32/192, of 19 December 1977,
on reverse transfer of technology, the United Nations General
Assembly in paragraph 3 urged:
... the developing countries to give immediate considera¬
tion to the modalities for promoting collective self-
^®Intemational Labour Conference, Sixtieth Session,
Record of Proceedings (Geneva, ILO, 1975), Tenth (special)
Sitting (10 June 1975), p. 190.
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reliance among themselves with a view to using and
developing their human resources on the basis of
mutual advantage within the broader framework of co¬
operation in the fields of trade, technology and
capital.
There is also some empirical evidence which provides
examples of and si:pports the case for greater inter-developing
country co-operation in this area. For example, the four
country case studies slubmitted by the UNCTAD secretariat, on
India, Pakistan, Philippines and Srilanka, bring out a number
of interesting facts in this regard. They show, for exanple,
that there has, in recent years, been an increasing trend in
favor of migration from certain skill-surplus to skill-deficit
developing countries, and that several of the countries studied
seem to be actively encouraging inter-developing country mig¬
ration in selected skills. InSriLanka, for example, the
study indicates that more than 35 percent of doctors, engineers,
teachers and accountants (who migrated abroad over the period
1971-1974) went to ther developing countries. In the case of
Pakistan, of the total nvimber of nationals (both skilled and
unskilled) employed abroad at the end of 1977, nearly 45 per¬
cent were working in other developing cotmtries. In the case
of India and the Philippines, the UNCTAD studies indicate that
a significant amount of skilled manpower flows to the Middle
IT . ^0East.
The previous efforts and proposals by LDCs to narrow
39
UNCTAD, Co-operative Exchange of Skills ^ong Develop¬




the technological gap are very encouraging signals. However,
those proposals remain to be explored in depth. Much research
work needs to be done in this field in order to achieve viable
policies.
The Question of Appropriate
Technology for LDCs
The logic that the transfer of appropriate technology
to LDCs will foster industrialization, increase en5>loyment,
and stimulate trade has become a dominant theme in interna¬
tional development circles.
The NIEO proposal on technology transfer states that
such transfer must take into account the social and economic
conditions in less developed comtries.
The economic conditions in developing nations differ
in a number of respects from those of the industrialized
nations. Typically, developing nations have rather large
ratios of unskilled to skilled labor relative to those of
developed nations. Most developing nations also have low rates
of capital formation, so that they are characteristically capi¬
tal-poor when conpared with industrialized nations. Thus, unit
labor costs in these nations are generally lower than those in
the industrialized nations. These conditions have led many to
consider the need to develop and use labor-intensive and/or
capital saving technologies in developing countries. Such
technologies are sometimes referred to as "appropriate" tech¬
nologies. This usage can be misleading; for example, if a
61
nation's overriding goal is creating jobs over maximizing
national income, more labor-intensive technologies might be
chosen. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine a simpli¬
fied, labor-intensive process to manufacture petrochemicals.
Therefore, it can be argued that highly labor-intensive tech¬
nologies are not appropriate for all industrial sectors even
in developing countries.
In this context, there is a tendency to blame unemploy¬
ment in LDCs on the transfer of "inappropriate" technologies,
in the sense that they use too little labor and too much capi¬
tal .
44
The term "intermediate technology" has been used to
describe "appropriate technology." Presently, "there are no
widely accepted definitions of what constitute an appropriate,
low cost or intermediate technology.So the question of how
to develop technologies that are "appropriate" to the goals of
developing nations is the subject of wide controversy. Because
"appropriate technology" in this context means technology that
is optimal for a particular situation in a particular developing
nation, given that nation's economic and social conditions and
goals.
43
Department of State. U.S. Science and Technology for
Development: A Contribution to the 1979 U.N. Conference, p. 49.
44
E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful: Economics as if
People Mattered (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1973) .
45Nicholas Jequier, ed., Appropriate Technology: Problems
and Promises (Paris: December 10, 1976), p. 17.
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any new product.
In the opinion of the writer, based upon the research
undertaken, LDCs must continue their effort to narrow the tech
nological gap between them and DCs. The co-operative exchange
of skill among themselves is the first step toward improving
their technological infrastructure in order to enable them to
absorb the new technology that fits their needs. The responsi
bility does not only lie with LDCs, but with DCs also. They
must stop restrictive practices in technology transfer, and
implement policies to lessen the "brain drain." There is a
code of conduct on transfer of technology that was drawn up by
the Group of 77.^^ DCs need to give strong consideration to
adopting this code. If this code^^ is adopted by DCs, it will
go a long way towards minimizing some of the problems asso¬
ciated with the transfer of technology from DCs to LDCs.
UNCTAD, An International Code of Conduct on Transfer
of Technology (New York, 1975).
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The main objectives of the Code would have to deal
with the following problem areas:
a) To control and regulate the costs of technology,
especially those arising from transfer pricing
and accounting;
b) To eliminate the many restrictions associated
with the transfer of technology to LDCs;
c) To give LDCs access to impackaged technology;
d) To establish international rules that will
act as safeguard to national laws and poli¬
cies on transfer of technology.
CONCLUSION
At the beginning of the thesis, it was explained that
technology is the main instrument for economic growth. The
more the country spends on R&D the better its trade balance
on manufactured commodities will be. This has been the case
for DCs. On the other hand, the technological endowment needed
for R&D in LDCs is very insignificant compared to DCs. This
fact makes it impossible for LDCs to enter the world market
of manufactured commodities and compete as well with DCs, The
fluctuation in the prices of primary commodities and the in¬
creasing prices of manufactured commodities are causing a
chronic balance of trade deficit in LDCs. The best way to
alleviate this deficit which is the major cuase of underdevelop¬
ment in LDCs is the rapid adaption of R&D. But unfortxmately,
the technologies that have been transferred to LDCs have been
accompanied by many restrictive practices, thereby undermining
the R&D capabilities in LDCs, The study also showed that, the
phenomenon of "brain drain" in LDCs discourage the development
of local skills, thereby undermining the possibilities of self-
reliance in development. The theory of the "Product Cycle" was
used to show the location of LDCs in the world technology mar¬
ket. The results show that LDCs were at the end of the cycle.
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